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Abstract
Baldwin and Richardson (1972) and Miyagiwa (1991) laid out the conditions un-
der which a home-bias in public procurement is rendered ineﬀective as a protectionist
device. Since then there has been little empirical work on this subject. In this paper,
we bridge this gap by building a new dataset from WTO notiﬁcations on domestic and
foreign purchases by Japanese and Swiss governments at the sector level over 1990-2003
and use it to test the BRM theoretical predictions. Signiﬁcantly, our empirical results
support these theoretical predictions.
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1 Introduction
The earliest work on the eﬀects of a home-bias in public procurement has been the formal
result derived by Baldwin (1970, 1984) and Baldwin and Richardson (1972). In a partial
equilibrium perfectly competitive framework, when imported and domestic goods are perfect
substitutes and when government demand for these goods is a fraction of domestic output,
then a reduction in imports from the government is compensated by a corresponding in-
crease in the imports of the private sector. Thus the eﬀect of a home-bias in procurement
on domestic output and imports is neutralized and discriminatory public procurement is
rendered ineﬀective as a protectionist device. Miyagiwa (1991) extended this result to an
oligopolistic set-up showing that the crucial assumption for the neutrality proposition
(term coined by Brülhart and Trionfetti, 2004) was perfect substitutability between imported
and domestic goods. He also showed the result to be less clear-cut for diﬀerentiated goods.
Other theoretical work on this subject includes that by Chen (1995), Trionfetti (1997, 2001),
Weichenrieder (2001) and Evenett and Hoekman (2005), but no empirical evidence. The
part exception to this is the study by Francois et al. (1997), which compares public and
private demand across 85 US industrial sectors and infers the ineﬀectiveness of home-bias
from the smallness of public demand. Using EU data, Brülhart and Trionfetti (2001, 2004)
show that procurement home-bias matters for industrial location/specialization, but their
focus is not the Baldwin-Richardson-Miyagiwa (BRM) theoretical predictions.
In this paper, we bridge the gap in this empirical literature by building a new dataset from
WTO notiﬁcations on domestic and foreign purchases by Japanese and Swiss1 governments
at the sector level over 1990-2003 and use a diﬀerent econometric approach to provide a
ceteris paribus test of the BRM theoretical predictions. Signiﬁcantly, our empirical results
support these predictions.
2 Data
Procurement data are assembled from statistical submissions made by the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Government Procurement (URGPA) signatories to the Committee on Gov-
ernment Procurement under Article XIX: 5 of the URGPA. Unfortunately, only Canada,
the EC, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway and USA has submitted these data regularly since the
1Our choice of countries is primarily determined by data availability. Both countries have submitted
detailed procurement data suﬃciently regularly over 1990-2003 (Japanese procurement data are missing for
1994-1996, the Swiss for 1992) and in a form amenable to econometric analysis.
Uruguay Round2.
Even amongst the countries that have submitted these data, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences,
both in terms of what is included and how it is included3, and the need for consistency
has thus determined the choice of sample countries for this analysis. For both Japan and
Switzerland, we consider all goods4 procured by central government entities included in
Annex 1 of Appendix 1 of the URGPA; the sector descriptions are available in Table 1.
Government procurement rules at the WTO require that only contracts above a certain
threshold5 value be subject to internationally competitive bidding. Article XIX: 5(b) of the
URGPA requires submission of data on above-threshold procurement by sector according
to the nationality of the winning supplier. This gives us both the value and the number of
contracts supplied from abroad by sector.
Looking at these data averages by sector for both countries over 1990-2003 in Table 1, we
see that Japanese goods procurement was concentrated in machinery; medical, scientiﬁc
and photographic equipment; and telecom and electrical equipment (together accounting for
80.4% of total goods procurement), but apart from medical etc. equipment, market access
was not high in any of these sectors either by value or number of contracts awarded. In the
case of Switzerland, machinery; transport; and medical, scientiﬁc and photographic equip-
ment were the three largest sectors accounting for 73.1% of total goods procurement over
time and the propensity of Swiss governments to source from abroad was high in these sectors
(as well as in agriculture; wood, paper; textiles; and telecom and electrical equipment).
<Insert Table 1 here>
We can use private sector import propensities to simulate public sector imports and then use
the diﬀerence between simulated and actual levels of foreign procurement to derive a measure
of the home-bias. Following Shingal (2011), we call this measure the Private-Public Purchase
Diﬀerential (PPPD)6. Signiﬁcantly, the ﬁtted plot of PPPD against sectoral government
2Switzerland has not provided data beyond 2003. A snapshot of country procurement submissions is
available at http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gpstat_e.htm.
3For instance, Norway and the US employ a diﬀerent classiﬁcation system compared to the EC, Japan
and Switzerland which makes it impossible to analyze data at the disaggregated sectoral level for the period
under study. Canada provides no information on nationality of winning suppliers. Hong Kong's submissions
until very recently have had restricted access.
4We exclude services from our analysis as IIP and price data required in our empirical analyses were
unavailable for the services sectors.
5Thresholds diﬀer depending on the type of procurement and on the level of government making the
purchase.
6Formally, PPPDkt= [{(Mkt-V
f
kt)/Y kt}*ATVkt]-V
f
kt where Mk= Sectoral total import value, V
f
k= Sec-
toral public import value, Yk= Sectoral output, ATVk= Sectoral above-threshold procurement value.
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demand in Figure 1 also suggests that the magnitude of home-bias may have been greater in
the large government demand sectors and in line with the Baldwin and Richardson (1972)
result for such sectors, the eﬀects of this home-bias are unlikely to be benign.
<Insert Figure 1 here>
3 Empirical model
The BRM results yield the following testable propositions:
Proposition 1 (neutrality proposition): When government demand in a sector as a share of
domestic output is low and the procured good is homogeneous, then the sector's total (public
and private) imports are independent of the level of foreign procurement.
Formally, for the neutrality proposition to hold, ∂M
P
∂MG
= −1 where MG= public imports and
MP= private imports.
Now ∂MT = ∂MG + ∂MP so ∂M
T
∂MG
= 1 + ∂M
P
∂MG
= 1 + (−1 from the neutrality proposition) =
0, where MT = total imports.
Thus, for the neutrality proposition to hold ∂M
T
∂MG
= 0.
Proposition 2: In large public demand sectors, a procurement home-bias results in a decline
in total imports i.e. ∂M
T
∂MG
> 0.
Proposition 3 (from Miyagiwa, 1991): When the procured good is diﬀerentiated, the relation-
ship between total and public imports is ambiguous. However, assuming zero conjectural
variations, if foreign ﬁrm demand is suﬃciently convex and its total sales suﬃciently
large (Miyagiwa, 1991, pp. 1325), then ∂M
T
∂MG
< 0 i.e. discriminatory public procurement can
actually increase total imports.
We use an augmented import demand function (for instance see Warner and Kreinin, 1983)
to test the BRM results empirically using the following estimation:
MTkt=αt +αk+Ω1IIPkt+Ω2P
M
kt + Ω3P
d
kt + Ω4M
G
kt + Ω5M
G.sizekt + Ω6M
G.IITkt + Ω7sizekt +
Ω8IIT kt + ϑkt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1)
where k denotes the sector,MT is the volume of total imports, IIP is the index of industrial
production that proxies the impact of income on import demand, PM is the unit value import
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price (data on all three variables taken from Nicita and Olarreaga, 2007), P d is the domestic
price level (the Domestic Corporate Goods Price Index from the Bank of Japan and the
Producer Price Index from Oﬃce Fédéral de la Statistique, Switzerland), MG proxies the
volume of public imports using the number of procurement contracts awarded to foreign
ﬁrms7 (compiled from WTO-submitted data), unobserved sector-speciﬁc determinants are
captured by sector-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects (αk) and economy-wide determinants are captured
by year ﬁxed eﬀects (αt).
To test for the theoretical predictions in BRM, we interact MG with size, which is con-
structed sectorally as the share of total government demand in domestic output, and with
IIT, which is the Grubel and Lloyd (1971) measure of intra-industry trade8, and serves as
a proxy for the product diﬀerentiation within a sector and hence for the (in)substitutability
between domestic and imported products.
Formally, Sizek=
TPV Ak
Yk
where TPV Ak = Sectoral measure of total public demand, Yk= Sec-
toral output. Since the data reporting requirements of the URGPA require data on total
procurement to be reported annually but not at the sectoral level, TPV A is a constructed
variable such that TPV Akt = TPVt.
ATVkt∑
ATVkt
where TPV = Total procurement value, ATV =
Above-threshold procurement value. Thus, sizek ≈ 0 would denote sectors where public
demand was a fraction of domestic output.
The goods in the Japanese and Swiss procurement data are far more aggregated to enable
their classiﬁcation as homogeneous and diﬀerentiated on the basis of the Rauch (1999) clas-
siﬁcation. However, the IIT literature suggests that intra-industry trade is associated with
product diﬀerentiation and a la Yang (1997) we therefore use the extent of IIT in a sector
to proxy the extent of product diﬀerentiation in that sector. Thus, IITk = 0 would denote
sectors with homogeneous goods implying perfect substitutability.
A priori, we expect Ω1 and Ω3 to be positive and Ω2 to be negative. A statistically signiﬁcant
estimate of Ω4 ≈ 0 or estimated Ω4 statistically indiﬀerent from zero would validate the
neutrality proposition, with size and IIT as additional controls. With size as an additional
control variable, a positive estimate of (Ω4 + Ω5) signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero would
validate Proposition 2. With IIT as an additional control, in line with Proposition 3,
the expected sign of Ω6 is ambiguous. But a statistically signiﬁcant estimate of (Ω4 +
Ω6)≈0 or estimated (Ω4 +Ω6) statistically indiﬀerent from zero would support the neutrality
7There are no data on the volume of public imports in the WTO submissions, but since we are dealing
with high value above-threshold procurement, an increase in the number of contracts awarded to foreign
ﬁrms must on average imply an increase in the volume of public imports.
8Formally, IIT k = 1  [abs(Xk-Mk)/(Xk+Mk)] whereXk = Sectoral export value,Mk = Sectoral import
value.
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proposition for diﬀerentiated goods. Finally, with both size and IIT in a fully-speciﬁed
equation (1), the overall estimate of (Ω4 +Ω5 +Ω6) would depend on the relative magnitudes
of Ω5 and Ω6 as well as the sign of the latter.
We found the dependent variable in equation (1) to be characterized by over-dispersion9
which rendered a log-linear OLS estimation biased. Given the scale-dependence of the neg-
ative binomial pseudo-maximum likelihood (PML) estimator (Bosquet and Boulhol, 2010),
the Poisson-PML (PPML) was our preferred estimator. The adequacy of the PPML was
also successfully tested using the Gauss Newton regression in Silva and Tenreyro (2006)10.
4 Results
Table 2 reports the results from estimating equation (1) on Japanese and Swiss data pooled
together. Given that the Japanese economy has a larger government and is also less open than
Switzerland11, we estimate equation (1) on the pooled sample with country ﬁxed eﬀects12.
While we focus on results from the PPML estimation reported in columns VI-X, for the sake
of comparison, we also report results from a standard log-linear OLS estimation in columns
I-V. As a robustness check, we also replaced TPV Ak with ATVk in the deﬁnition of our size
variable but found these (unreported) results to be robust to this change.
From Table 2 we see that the estimate of Ω4 in speciﬁcations VIII through X is both econom-
ically and statistically indiﬀerent from zero, which suggests that the neutrality proposition
is validated by both small public demand and homogeneous goods sectors.
Estimated (Ω4 + Ω5) is both economically and statistically diﬀerent from zero (0.011 and
0.014 in speciﬁcations VIII and X, respectively), which supports Proposition 2 and suggests
9Over-dispersion in the raw data is due to unobserved heterogeneity (Greene, 1994); the description is
used for data where the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean. Formally this is tested by pitting
the null of V ar(y|x) = E(y|x) against V ar(y|x) = E(y|x)+α.E(y|x)2 where α > 0 suggests over-dispersion.
Following Cameron and Trivedi (2005), the null of α = 0 against α > 0 is the t-test of α obtained by running
the auxiliary (no-constant) OLS regression {y−E(y|x)}
2−y
E(y|x) = α.E(y|x) +  where E(y|x) are the ﬁtted values
from estimating the Poisson model. The alternative of α > 0 failed rejection conclusively (p-value=1).
10Formally, ε
2√
E(y|x) = γ.
√
E(y|x) + γ(λ − 1).lnE(y|x).√E(y|x) + ξ is estimated using OLS, where ε =
y −E(y|x) and E(y|x) = exp(xβ) and the statistical signiﬁcance of γ.(λ− 1) is tested using a Eicker-White
robust covariance matrix estimator. The null of γ.(λ − 1) = 0 (or λ=1 i.e. evidence for the PPML) failed
rejection at the 5% level of signiﬁcance (p-value = 0.066).
11The average share of total government expenditure in GDP over 1990-2003 was almost 50% in Japan
versus 37% in Switzerland, while the average share of trade in GDP in these economies was 19.2 and 74.6%,
respectively, over the same period.
12Given that sector deﬁnition is consistent across the two countries, we do not include country-and-sector
ﬁxed eﬀects. However, we also estimated equation (1) with country, sector and country-and-year ﬁxed eﬀects,
but found these (unreported) results to be qualitatively similar.
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that the eﬀect of a procurement home-bias on total imports may not be neutralized in large
public demand sectors. This ﬁnding holds even when we control for product diﬀerentiation
within a sector, driving the overall non-zero estimate of (Ω4+Ω5+Ω6) in the full-speciﬁcation
X.
Interestingly, estimates of (Ω4 + Ω6) are found to be both economically and statistically in-
diﬀerent from zero in both IX and X, which suggests that the neutrality proposition seems to
hold for diﬀerentiated goods in our data13. Following Proposition 3, this last ﬁnding suggests
that foreign suppliers to these markets may not have faced suﬃciently convex demands and
that they may have made insuﬃcient total (public and private) sales to these countries in the
diﬀerentiated sectors or that their conjectural variations may have been positive (Miyagiwa,
1991, pp. 1325).
<Insert Table 2 here>
To further examine these results at the country-level, we also estimated equation (1) on
Japanese and Swiss data in separate regressions. The results from these, using the PPML
estimator, are reported in Table 3. Though we do not ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant evidence for
Proposition 2 in these results for either country, we now ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant evidence
(though weak in the case of Japan) for the neutrality proposition for both homogeneous and
diﬀerentiated goods (estimates of Ω4 ≈ 0, Ω4 + Ω6 ≈ 0 in columns IV and IX). This said,
given the larger number of observations in the pooled sample, the results reported in Table
2 constitute a more robust test of the BRM theoretical predictions.
<Insert Table 3 here>
5 Conclusion
We provide new econometric evidence on the Baldwin and Richardson (1972)/Miyagiwa
(1991) ineﬀectiveness proposition in public procurement. Our empirical result on the adverse
eﬀects of a procurement home-bias in large public demand sectors provides more support to
the preliminary evidence (Trionfetti, 2000) in this literature on the impact of discriminatory
procurement on trade ﬂows and international specialisation. The result is also signiﬁcant
given the current economic stagnation in advanced economies and their well-documented
home-bias in public purchase decisions during the recent crisis (Evenett, 2009a,b).
13The OLS estimates, on the other hand, refute all four propositions emanating from the BRM predictions.
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Figure 1: Home-bias v magnitude of government demand
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Note: (1) The ﬁgure shows ﬁtted values from a linear prediction (2) PPPD is a measure of the sectoral home-bias in public
procurement; ATVk/
∑
ATV is a measure of the relative magnitude of public demand by sector [ATV = Above-threshold pro-
curement value] (3) Figure suggests a positive relationship between the sectoral magnitude of home-bias and that of government
demand in both countries.
Table 1: Procurement and other data by sector (average 1990-2003)

Sector ATV Vf Vf/ATV ATN Nf Nf/ATN IIP MT PM Pd IIT Size
Agriculture 0.7 0.2 25.8% 1.5 0.5 29.4% 99.1 14.0 1.5 97.9 0.13 0.000
Chemicals, pharma 215.2 72.6 33.8% 1761.1 498.3 28.3% 107.9 12.0 1.8 100.6 0.82 0.003
Plastic, rubber, leather 18.1 0.4 2.3% 33.0 0.5 1.4% 97.4 1.0 7.1 101.7 0.93 0.000
Wood, paper 198.7 8.6 4.3% 262.4 10.0 3.8% 92.1 13.0 0.7 101.5 0.37 0.005
Textiles 89.5 1.6 1.7% 139.3 2.5 1.8% 89.2 1.9 9.6 103.5 0.52 0.004
Stone, ceramic, glass 3.5 0.0 1.1% 9.1 0.2 2.0% 91.2 3.2 0.7 101.7 0.80 0.000
Iron & steel, non-fer metals 124.1 3.4 2.8% 158.2 6.5 4.1% 99.7 13.0 1.1 107.1 0.85 0.002
Machinery 2438.6 199.9 8.2% 1077.3 91.4 8.5% 98.5 1.1 20.2 101.4 0.48 0.018
Telecom & electrical equipment 881.9 58.8 6.7% 626.5 41.8 6.7% 119.5 15.0 21.8 111.4 0.51 0.006
Transport equipment 364.0 56.1 15.4% 351.2 31.1 8.9% 107.1 0.41 20.5 101.5 0.26 0.002
Medical, scientific, photographic equip 984.6 307.6 31.2% 2996.6 864.2 28.8% 108.1 0.15 101.4 101.1 0.70 0.050
Furniture 37.5 0.2 0.6% 100.7 0.9 0.9% 106.7 0.67 4.4 99.8 0.27 0.004
Sector ATV Vf Vf/ATV ATN Nf Nf/ATN IIP MT PM Pd IIT Size
Agriculture 15.7 10.2 65.2% 29.1 21.2 72.8% 97.6 1.9 1.7 106.7 0.80 0.004
Chemicals, pharma 1.1 0.1 7.1% 2.5 0.4 15.6% 168.7 4.2 2.9 117.4 0.74 0.000
Plastic, rubber, leather 6.2 1.7 28.0% 9.5 1.4 14.6% 106.1 0.31 6.7 95.0 0.82 0.003
Wood, paper 3.2 1.7 52.6% 7.8 3.6 46.5% 100.6 2.5 1.0 100.9 0.80 0.003
Textiles 6.6 2.3 35.1% 16.5 5.8 35.3% 89.2 0.24 18.8 98.1 0.68 0.005
Stone, ceramic, glass 0.3 0.0 0.0% 1.9 0.0 0.0% 114.9 1.9 0.6 99.2 0.71 0.000
Iron & steel, non-fer metals 8.0 0.9 11.0% 12.8 1.5 12.0% 109.6 2.7 1.2 99.3 0.87 0.006
Machinery 112.6 82.1 72.9% 165.3 118.0 71.4% 109.6 0.52 20.2 96.8 0.80 0.010
Telecom & electrical equipment 13.4 5.5 41.0% 20.6 7.8 38.1% 106.6 0.21 27.8 96.8 0.97 0.002
Transport equipment 40.6 15.6 38.4% 35.6 13.9 39.1% 106.8 0.58 14.4 104.9 0.36 0.041
Medical, scientific, photographic equip 22.5 12.5 55.7% 33.8 21.4 63.2% 107.2 0.02 83.2 98.8 0.42 0.005
Furniture 10.2 2.9 28.2% 10.0 2.1 20.8% 100.1 0.31 4.8 97.1 0.48 0.007
Switzerland
Japan
Source: WTO (various years); Nicita & Olarreaga (2006); Bank of Japan (various years); Oﬃce Fédéral de la Statistique,
Switzerland (various years); own calculations
Note: (1) ATV = Above-threshold procurement by value of contracts; V f = Value of contracts awarded to foreign suppliers;
ATN = Above-threshold procurement by number of contracts; Nf = Number of contracts awarded to foreign suppliers; rest
of the variables are as deﬁned in the paper (2) Units of measurement: ATV, V f (real USD mn); ATN, Nf (units); IIP, PM , P d
(indices); MT (billion units); IIT, size (ratios)
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Table 2: Results: Combined

I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
IIP 1.061*** 1.514*** 1.723*** 1.530*** 1.655*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.007***
(0.249) (0.438) (0.432) (0.382) (0.371) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
PM -1.566*** -1.600*** -1.327*** -1.159*** -1.042*** -0.146*** -0.147*** -0.137*** -0.157*** -0.147***
(0.160) (0.208) (0.236) (0.189) (0.211) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.022)
Pd 1.732* 2.934** 3.529** 3.127** 2.953** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.006* 0.007**
(0.774) (1.082) (1.262) (0.953) (1.096) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
MG 0.090* 0.120* -0.259** -0.204# -0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003
(0.039) (0.054) (0.092) (0.113) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Size 9.876** 6.397* 5.995** 4.678#
(2.932) (2.629) (2.136) (2.489)
MG.Size
-1.254 -0.396 0.011* 0.011#
(0.845) (0.810) (0.005) (0.006)
IIT -2.618*** -2.513*** -0.971*** -0.749***
(0.417) (0.503) (0.154) (0.200)
MG.IIT 0.626*** 0.565*** -0.002 -0.003
(0.124) (0.148) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 10.456** 2.240 -1.685 2.146 2.140 21.677*** 21.957*** 21.413*** 22.428*** 22.053***
(3.586) (5.580) (6.359) (4.774) (5.536) (0.224) (0.300) (0.329) (0.344) (0.390)
# Observations 258 178 155 178 155 258 258 219 258 219
df_m 27 27 29 29 31 27 28 30 30 32
r2 0.918 0.926 0.939 0.941 0.949 0.963 0.964 0.968 0.959 0.962
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
OLS log-linear (dependent variable: MT ) PPML (dependent variable: MT)
Note: (1) Legend: # p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 (2) Standard errors reported in brackets.
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Table 3: Results: Japan v Switzerland
PPML 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
IIP 0.004# 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.001* -0.001# 0.000 -0.001# 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PM -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.065** -0.052** -0.046** -0.026*** -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.029*** -0.032***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Pd 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.012** 0.011** -0.003* -0.002# -0.005*** -0.002* -0.005**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
MG 0.000 -0.000 0.004# 0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.007** 0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.008)
Size 19.017* 12.345# -0.298 -0.310
(7.821) (6.916) (0.341) (0.327)
MG.Size
-0.006 -0.005 0.104 0.123
(0.006) (0.004) (0.090) (0.085)
IIT 1.918*** 1.837*** -0.063 0.005
(0.511) (0.516) (0.133) (0.139)
MG.IIT -0.005# -0.004 0.010** -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010)
Constant 22.647*** 22.644*** 22.731*** 21.801*** 21.882*** 21.655*** 21.608*** 21.738*** 21.655*** 21.728***
(0.470) (0.491) (0.471) (0.488) (0.480) (0.160) (0.150) (0.155) (0.202) (0.221)
# Observations 120 120 120 120 120 138 138 99 138 99
df_m 23 24 26 26 28 26 27 26 29 28
r2 0.965 0.965 0.967 0.975 0.975 0.996 0.996 0.998 0.996 0.998
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Switzerland (dependent variable: MT)Japan (dependent variable: MT )
Note: (1) Legend: # p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 (2) Standard errors reported in brackets.
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